When Yugoslavia dissolved in the 1990s, many Serbs found themselves in new states in which they were not the majority population. They often rejected their inclusion in these states, first through political boycotts and then through violence and secession. This paper will look at the integration of the Serb community in the new states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo. The aim is to achieve a clearer picture of the different strategies of state-building and group integration in the post-Yugoslav states. The integration of Serbs in these states took place in a number of ways: in Bosnia and Herzegovina they were recognized as one of three constituent peoples (in 1995), while Croatia awarded Serbs the status of a national minority. In Kosovo (after 2008), Serbs have also been recognized as a constituent element of the state and protected by legal equality. Applying the framework of the "quadratic nexus", this paper will look at the interplay of new states, the Serb community, Serbia, and international actors in order to assess the current state of Serb integration in these states.
6 Different international actors played a key role in all three countries. While NATO mainly focused on the military aspects of de-escalation and de-militarization, the UN supported refugee return and in Kosovo also the political transition. In Macedonia, the EU played a particularly important role after the Ohrid Agreement, while in Bosnia the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which includes a number of countries involved in the peace process, became an important actor, as they oversee the work of the Office of the High Representative. 7 I use the term de facto independence because I look at Kosovo after 1999, when it was still part of Serbia but under the administration of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Kosovo will be treated in this paper as an independent country after the declaration of independence by the Kosovo Parliamentary Assembly in February 2008. 8 Montenegro will not be considered in this paper, because identities remain fluid in the country and there are no special institutional provisions for the integration of the Serb community in Montenegro. For more information see Jelena DZANKIC, Lineages of Citizenship in Montenegro. CITSEE Working Papers 2010/14, available at: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/series/371_lineagesofcitizenshipinmontenegro.pdf, 12.09.2012. 9 Neither the Serb statelet Republika Krajna, nor the RS in Bosnia ever joined Serbia or were recognized by Serbia. Yet, it is widely established that they were created as part of a strategy for the creation of a Greater Serbia, see for example: James GOW The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries. . 19 Croatia's President Tuđman made it very clear in his speeches that he saw Croatia as a nation-state of Croats in which Serbs would be reduced to a minority with limited rights. While their legal status was more protected in Bosnia after 1990, the push for independence of Bosnia by Bosniak and Croat elites alienated the Serb leadership and many Serbs, and gave a clear indication that they would be dominated by a Bosniak-Croat alliance in an independent Bosnia. 20 Serbia has not recognized Kosovo and continues to treat it as part of its own territory. Serbian authorities consider Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence as illegal.
pattern of Serb engagement with other ethnic groups in the Western Balkans, namely the emphasis on Serb victimhood and suffering. 21 In this discourse it was the Serb nation that had become displaced throughout the post-Yugoslav states and now had to live as a minority in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. 
Different concepts of minority integration in new states
The forms of minority protection to be found in the three countries are the result of actions taken by the integrate minority nations, the most relevant ones for our paper are integration through the protection of minority rights, protection through autonomy (either territorial or cultural), and protection through power-sharing.
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It has become internationally recognized that minority nations should have a right to cultural, linguistic, and religious protection and that states have the obligation to protect these rights. In Europe, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has become one of the most detailed legal provisions about the obligations of states towards minority nations on their territory. 32 The Convention states in Article 5.1 that "The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage."
The basic framework provided by the Convention and other international protection frameworks, such as the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe's (OSCE) High Commissioner on National
Minorities focuses on fundamental human rights for minorities as well as additional cultural rights connected to their national customs and history. According to these international frameworks, states have the obligation to treat minority nations equally and provide them with additional rights so that they practise their own language, religion, and culture. One way to ensure this is by granting minority nations cultural autonomy. This means that all members identifying with one group enjoy the same cultural rights to enable them to practise and protect their own national identity, customs, and tradition.
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Another form of minority integration is territorial autonomy. This is often granted through specific decentralization or federalization processes in which territories that are inhabited by a minority nation receive more decision-making autonomy. Processes of decentralization and federalization in Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom have addressed the demands of minority nations for territorial autonomy and self-governance. However, Belgium and Canada are also good examples, illustrating also some of the limits of territorial autonomy. Questions about the degree of autonomy and inter-group relations often play a key role in countries that choose to implement forms of territorial autonomy.
Furthermore, asymmetrical forms of decentralization, as practised in Spain and the UK, have resulted in political conflicts and discussions about the unequal treatment of groups and citizens in states. 34 Finally, power-sharing has been a key strategy for the promotion of peace and democracy in divided societies. There are different forms of power-sharing, which often include elements of cultural 31 For different strategies of minority integration, see: Alexis HERACLIDES, Ethnicity, Secessionist Conflict and the International Society: Towards Normative Paradigm Shift, Nations and Nationalism 3 (1997), n. and/or territorial autonomy. In practice, the most common form of power-sharing as an instrument of minority protection is consociationalism. 35 Consociationalism, according to Arend Lijphart, is defined by four core elements, namely elite cooperation through grand coalitions, proportional representation, (minority) veto rights, and autonomy for minority nations.
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Which of these integration strategies is being used depends on a number of factors. As will be shown, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a tradition of ethnic power-sharing between Bosniaks, Bosnian
Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. This form of power-sharing existed during the Communist period as well as after the first free elections in 1991. Hence, once the war had ended, power-sharing was re-introduced and formalized in the Bosnian Constitution, which is part of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, it can be argued that historical experiences, but also the continued existence of a large number of Serbs in Bosnia, were the main reasons for the formal introduction of institutionalized power-sharing and territorial autonomy. This is different to Croatia, where Croats and Serbs were treated equally and where both had the status of a constituent nation under The next section compares and contrasts the institutionalized forms of Serb integration in Bosnia,
Croatia, and Kosovo in more detail. In doing so it analyzes some of the key features of the "triadic nexus" and the role of the international community.
Institutionalizing Serb minority protection in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo

Legal Status and Institutional Representation
As a brief summary we can say that Croatia grants Serbs protection through the status of a national minority, while Bosnia and Kosovo have institutionalized the protection of the Serb community further.
In Kosovo, Serbs are a constituent nation and Serbian is an official language. There are also reserved seats in parliament and government for Serb representatives and Serb municipalities enjoy a high degree of self-government. In Bosnia, Serbs have "their own" territorial unit, namely the Republika Srpska In contrast to the situation in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo grant different forms of territorial autonomy to the Serb community. As already mentioned, the RS is one of two entities in Bosnia. It is mainly inhabited by Serbs and has a high degree of autonomy, which includes responsibilities for economic development, its own financial resources, decision-making powers in the areas of education, police, media, culture, environmental protection, and even limited competences in foreign policy. In fact, until 2005, the RS had its own military and border police and its own Value-Added-Tax regime. When Bosnia re-integrated as a unified country after the war in 1995 the entities were the main holders of decisionmaking competences and centralization was only a gradual process, starting in 1997, when the powers of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) (the international observer over the implementation of the peace agreement) were extended. 54 Since then the RS has lost some of its competences (such as its own military and control over the border service) but has remained a key holder of competences in they do not challenge the majority. 60 This also explains why rights were limited to some form of cultural
autonomy. Yet, more recent discussions on the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in Vukovar and other parts of Croatia demonstrate that while the legal framework provides some basic rights for Serbs in the country, in practice these remain contested, while the picture of Serbs as the aggressor and enemy often prevails in the dominant Croat discourse. In Bosnia, there is no cultural autonomy for groups as such.
All rights are connected to territories and Serbs living in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not enjoy special forms of cultural autonomy. In Kosovo, all minorities enjoy special rights in the field of culture, education, and language rights. This has been a key element of the Ahtisaari Plan and has particularly favoured the Serbs as the largest minority group in Kosovo, as they can use their own language, have their own education system, and protect their own culture.
Institutional Provisions and the Triadic Nexus
When comparing the integration of the Serb community in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo a number of important issues have emerged. First, these new states use different instruments to integrate the Serb community. These can be minority rights, reserved seats in parliament and/or in the government, and territorial and cultural autonomy. The specific set of rights and institutional participation granted to the Serb community depends on a number of factors: first, the size of the Serbian community in the country;
second, the development of minority-majority relations in the process of the break-up of Yugoslavia;
and finally, the pressure of international actors on majorities to implement certain protections and institutional participation mechanisms for the integration of the Serb community. Furthermore, Serbia itself has also had an impact on the protection regime in these countries, particularly in Kosovo, where it has been the main negotiator on behalf of the Kosovo Serbs. improved relations between the two states, which also benefited the Serbs in Croatia. A key problem in the 'triadic nexus', that is between the new states (Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo), the Serb community in these countries, and Serbia, is the lack of a coordinated dialogue. While some attempts have been made to coordinate policy between Croatia and Serbia, and also between Bosnia and Serbia, overall there remains a lack of trust and willingness to work together. The situation between Kosovo and Serbia is even more problematic, since direct dialogue is undermined by the fundamentally different approaches to Kosovo's status.
Conclusion
While the situation in the Western Balkans is specific and certainly the situation in each of the three countries is somewhat unique, there are nevertheless some important lessons that can be learnt from the integration of the Serbs into the new states of Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. Croatia and to some extent also in Kosovo, there is nevertheless a lack of full engagement by governments in the question of minority integration and participation. The limited impact of the EU on the constitutional reform process in Bosnia, in particular in relation to the Sejdić-Finci decision of the European Court of Human Rights, demonstrates a lack of involvement in fundamental questions about minority rights. 66 As this paper has revealed, in order to understand the situation of a certain ethnic group in "new" states after violent state dissolution, the "quadratic nexus" proves a useful tool in order to analyse complex relationships. In particular, the different institutional mechanisms used in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo for the integration of the Serb community cannot be fully understood without taking 66 The European Human Rights Court ruled in December 2009 that the composition of the Bosnian State Presidency and the House of Peoples is discriminatory since it excludes certain groups. Finci, a Jew and Sejdić, a member of the Bosnian Roma community argued that they are politically discriminated because they cannot stand for office in these two institutions. The Court agreed with them and demanded that Bosnia changes its Constitution.
the role of international actors into account. They played a key rule during constitutional engineering (in Bosnia and Kosovo) and in the post-war state-building phase in all three countries. In particular, they had a substantial impact on the rules and regulations that frame Serb community integration in the three countries.
To achieve a long-term change in the perception of minorities more generally, and in the process of Serb integration in the three states specifically, is the EU's goal. It has a strategic commitment to initiate reform processes that will be of fundamental importance for progressing the democratization and Europeanization of the region. Certainly, regional cooperation will be important, in addition to the support for reconciliation and other mechanisms that improve inter-ethnic relations. Long-term changes need time and determination from all sides. The case of the Serb communities in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo demonstrates this very clearly.
